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Abstract
In our country, majority of agricultural workers (who may include farmers working within a coopera-
tive framework, or those who work individually either as owners or tenants) are shown to be reaping the
least amount of profits in the agriculture value chain when compared to the effort they put in. There is
a good amount of literature which broadly substantiates this situation in our country.
Main objective of this study is to have a broad understanding of the role played by public systems
in this value chain, particularly in the segment that interacts with farmers. As a starting point, we first
try to get a better understanding of how farmers are placed in a typical agriculture value chain. For
this we take the help of recent seminal works on this topic that captured the situation of farmers’ within
certain types of value chains. Then, we isolate the segment which interacts with farmers and deep-dive
into data to understand the role played by public interventions in determining farmers’ income from
agriculture.
NSSO 70th round on Situation Assessment Survey of farmers has data pertaining to the choices
of farmers and the type of their interaction with different players in the value chain. Using this data
we tried to get a econometric picture of the role played by government interventions and the extent to
which they determine the incomes that a typical farming household derives out of agriculture.
1 Introduction
Agriculture is the most critical lifeline of India which forms the livelihood of more than 57.8% of rural
households, constituting close to 460 million persons in the country[1]. Such a majority of the population
is often found to be constantly pulled down by the gravity of deep rooted poverty and deprivation. For
them to lead a life of dignity and satisfaction, it is essential to keep them out of those clutches which cause
them to be pulled down under poverty. In this country, where the economy in Agriculture is found to
greatly canvas over villages and their clusters, it is found that farmers, who form the core of this economy
are stuck in a kind of weird network of forces which puts them on the top in terms of the contributions
they make while not giving them a chance to reap profits on the same lines.
A study conducted by Kapur et.al[2] found that farmers who are part of Red Gram Supply Chain in
Karnataka contribute to more than 66% of the costs of activities involved in the value chain, while reap less
than 40% of the total profits accrued in it. If one looks at the time that farmers spend in their contributing
activities vis-a-vis other players, the intensity of their plight certainly rises. Often wholesale and retail
traders, middle-men, commission agents, and people involved in processing and transport, who are part of
this value chain are found only during the time of harvest but reap significant share in the profits accrued
looking by all means, whether it be the time spent in earning these profits or the total amount they get
by trading with a large number of farmers. In addition, farmers also bear the largest risks with little or
no formal insurance or risk management options[2]. In another study conducted by Sandip Mitra et.al[3]
on potato farmers in West Bengal, authors highlight the nature of asymmetric information in agriculture
markets which contribute to a similar problem where farmers often end up in a relatively poor situation.
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Following paragraph quoted from their study gives a perspective of the problem at hand
“Not only do farmers lack direct access to mandis; they are also unaware of the prices at which their
potatoes are resold there. The gaps between these resale prices and farmgate prices are large: in the year of
our study, farmgate prices were 44% to 46% of wholesale prices. Our calculations suggest that middlemen
earned 50% to 71% of this gap. The pass-through from retail prices to farmgate prices was a statistically
insignificant, negligible 2%, while pass-through to wholesale prices was a much larger 81%.”
Clearly this indicates that, within the network of various stakeholders who are part of agriculture
value chain, it is farmers who often end up being the vulnerable lot. Although some big farmers and
landlords may be exceptions in terms of having greater influence in the markets, their proportion in total
farmers doesn’t downplay the intensity of deprivation farmers’ as a group face in this country. According
to NSSO Situation Assessment Survey report[1] of 2013,
“About 69 percent of the agricultural households possessed land less than 1 hectare during the agricul-
tural year July 2012- June 2013. Only 0.4 percent of the agricultural households possessed land 10 hectares
or more.”
In the following sections, we first try to understand the situation of farmers in the context of agri-
culture value chain from few recent studies. Then we carefully try to look at the segment within this value
chain where farmers usually make their choices which determine the extent of profits they may receive out
of agriculture. The key reflections of farmers’ choices or their determinants that we investigate from data
are a. Information inputs (Awareness of MSP and source of technical advice), b. Choices of Input side pro-
curement (Whether procured from Govt/Non-Govt agencies), and c. Choice for Sale of produce(Whether
sale to Govt/Non-Govt agencies). We discuss the role of government interventions in this context by an
econometric analysis of how farmers’ choices or their determinants listed previously, contribute to their
agriculture incomes.
2 Agriculture markets and role of public interventions
Public interventions into agriculture find their place mainly in strengthening forward and backward link-
ages that connect farmers to the input and produce markets. On the input side public institutions play
a key role in helping farmers with their choice of seeds, fertilizers, technology etc.., in farming. On the
output/produce side they have two major roles. Declaring and enabling Minimum Support Price (MSP)
for certain notified agricultural commodities is one role where the public institutions play a major role.
In procurement of the said kinds of agriculture produce through government channels, these institutions
act as enabling systems for realizing MSP. The second and also a major role that is taken up by the state
governments1, is to regulate agricultural commodity markets through state specific Agriculture Produce
Marketing (APM) Acts. Within the purview of these acts, corresponding public systems (Here, Agriculture
Produce Marketing Committees) manage Mandi operations and govern the way trade is carried out within
them.
In this study, we mainly focus on the role played by government in the inputs’ side of agriculture
and some aspects in the output side mainly in its role as a procurement agent. Firstly, on the inputs’ side,
in terms of information dissemination in agriculture, public systems interact with farmers in determining
their choice of technology, choice of crop and other practices. They also facilitate programs which may
determine farmers’ awareness of MSP. Secondly, government interventions may also determine the choice
of procurement of inputs like seeds and fertilizers. Lastly, in the output side, public systems play the role
of procurement agent alongside non-government players like local traders, middle-men and other agents
which procure farm produce.
In the subsequent sections, using NSSO data (Situation Assessment Survey data of 2013 (NSSO-
1Agriculture is a state subject
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SAS)[1]), we broadly investigate into the role played by public systems or government interventions par-
ticularly on the above mentioned dimensions in contributing to farmers’ agricultural incomes. Before
proceeding to econometric analysis on the available data, in the following section, we first look at the
placement of farmers’ in a typical agriculture value chain from recent seminal works, which may help us
further to relate the results and discuss in context.
3 Farmers in agriculture value chains - a review of literature
In their study on Understanding price variation in agriculture commodities in India, Chatterjee et.al[4] have
given a lucid narrative of the history of agriculture markets in India. Following paragraph summarizes an
existing governance mechanism in place, in terms of operation of Mandis, which play a dominant role in
agriculture markets.
“State specific APM Acts provide for the formation of Agriculture Produce Marketing Committees
(APMC) which are tasked to operate agriculture markets. Prices are discovered through what in principle
is an open auction. Critically, once an area was declared a market area and falls under the jurisdiction
of a Market Committee, no person or agency was allowed freely to carry on wholesale marketing activities
elsewhere. Not only did the government issue licenses to trade in these markets but also the licenses were
state and mandi specific. First sale in the notified agricultural commodities produced in the region such
as cereals, pulses, edible oilseed, fruits and vegetables and even chicken, goat, sheep, sugar, fish etc., can
be conducted only under the aegis of the APMC, through its licensed commission agents, and subject to
payment of various taxes and fee.[4]”.
However in the implementation of these acts as regulatory agents, many governments failed to ensure
that farmers were offered fair prices in a transparent manner. These failures were mainly attributed to
severe governance challenges in mandis which caused to bring down these markets as fragmented, inefficient
and lacking transparency in their operations[4].
In another study, Kapur et.al[2], along with IIM Bangalore, have undertaken research to analyze Red
Gram supply chain in Karnataka. Following picture taken from their Working paper on Understanding
Mandis[2], show the various players involved, and their interactions within red gram supply chain in Kar-
nataka. Their study revealed that, on average, the farmers’ profit comes out to be approximately 39% of
the profit across the supply chain, in contrast to their contribution which is found to be over 66% of the
total supply chain costs.
Figure 1: Red Gram Supply Chain
In another important study by Sandip Mitra et.al[3], an extensive analysis through thorough field
research has been carried out to understand the nature of trading relationships between middlemen and
farmers. Farmers in the context of their study2 sell most of their produce to village middlemen, who
2Potato Farmers
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aggregates it and resells at wholesale markets to bulk buyers from distant cities or neighbouring states.
Having no direct access to Mandis, or information about prices there, these farmers conduct their trade
interacting with either village middlemen or local traders from nearby villages. Farmers here have options of
either selling to village middlemen, or these traders in local haat3, or to send their produce to government
provided storage facility. This lack of direct access to wholesale markets is distinctive to West Bengal
potato supply chain, and the situation in other states might be different[3]. However, the situation in terms
of interacting with middle-men and traders might be similar across other states as well.
In all these studies one common phenomenon that has been observed, is that farmers (particularly
small and marginal) are at a considerable disadvantage in terms of the profits they get in the agriculture
value chains in comparison to the effort they put in. With a major contribution in the value chain,
producers reaping a compromisingly low profits is a therefore worry-some scenario in the country.
Above studies also discuss in detail on the nature of interaction of farmers’ with different players
in the agriculture value chain like, government, local traders, middle-men and so on. A glimpse of which
has been discussed in the previous paragraphs. However, on the input side, in terms of farmers’ procuring
seeds, fertilizers and other requirements, a similar nature of interaction persists with these players. Many
times farmers’ procure inputs and also information from the very same players to whom they sell their
produce. This may be due to dependence with the latter in terms of financial support or other reasons.
4 Farmers’ choices and role of public interventions - contribution to
agricultural income
Above discussion gives a perspective from prior studies on the possible factors that may play role in
determining farmers’ income from agriculture. Many such studies help in providing a rather worm’s-eye
perspective of the farmers’ situation, but may not truly give a macro picture. In order to understand the
farmers’ situation and the extent to which role of public interventions mattered across country, we need to
quantitatively get such a picture from available country-wide datasets. NSSO Situation Assessment Survey
(SAS) of agricultural households, the recent one conducted as a part of 70th round under 33rd Schedule,
has pertinent information on agricultural household characteristics which we try to use in this study. Using
this data, we intend to conduct econometric analysis in trying to answer the following questions.
Q1. To what extent does the role of government in providing access to information (about Minimum Sup-
port Price and technical advice regarding farming practices) help in contributing to farmers’ agriculture
income?
Q2. To what extent, does the role of public systems in provision of agricultural inputs (mainly seeds and
fertilizers), contribute to the agriculture incomes of farming households? and
Q3. What is the difference in agriculture incomes possibly caused due to the sale of output to government
vs non-government agencies?
5 Econometric Analysis
In this section, we use econometric techniques to understand the role of public interventions, based on
NSSO SAS data. For the purpose of simplicity, we illustrate the analysis pertaining to each question in the
following subsections, and present the results at the end. In all our models total income from agriculture
excluding animal husbandry (or Total Income solely from Cultivation of Crops (TICi)) is used as dependent
variable in our analysis. This can be computed by the difference of total crop sale value (TSVi) and total
3A market place organized mostly at cluster (a group of villages) level
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crop expenses (TCEi) available for each household in the dataset.
4
TICi = TSVi − TCEi
We truncate this variable at zero, so that households having net income less than zero are treated to have
zero income. Essentially we have truncated the dependent variable here. Proportion of households having
net income less than zero is close to 7% in the data which is very small compared to the total number of
households, therefore for the purpose of this study we ignore the effect of truncation. After accounting for
incomes less than zero, we finally use log(1 + TICi) as our dependent variable in the regression models
discussed further, because typically having a logarithm of incomes is beneficial to account for a wide
variation in income levels.
5.1 Role of public interventions - Information inputs
To answerQ1, we first create the relevant variables signifying awareness of farmers about MSP (MSP Aware)
and source of technical information about agriculture (Whether from Govt/Non-Govt agencies, Tech Govt).
We then address two different sub-questions here, one is by addressing the impact of awareness of MSP
on agriculture income and second is by addressing the impact of source of technical advice on agriculture
income of farmers. We use propensity score matching technique to answer each of these sub-questions and
the subsequent questions discussed in later sections.5
5.1.1 Awareness of MSP
We use MSP Aware as the grouping variable, and DCV b5a q13, CropCode, Tech Govt, InAgent Govt,
State, b3 q1,2, and 3 as our matching variables for analyzing the impact of awareness of MSP on agriculture
incomes. Following are the list of constructed variables and their description, in the models shown in this
section and further in our study.
Using propensity score matching, we use the matched dataset6 to run the following regression to
capture the effect of awareness of MSP on the agriculture incomes. (Note: We did not use variables b4 q7,
Tech Govt and PAgent Govt as these variables most likely are collinear to our treatment variable and hence
matching on the basis of these might give unreliable estimates)
lnTIC = β0+β1 MSP Aware +  – (1a),
Which essentially captures the effect of awareness of MSP in farmers’ agriculture incomes.
5.1.2 Source of technical advice
Similar to above model, we use Tech Govt as the grouping variable here, and other matching variables are
the same as that of the previous model. We include an additional matching variable PAgent Govt here.7
The regression model after balancing the matching variables is
4For the purpose of our study, we chose to work on Situation Assessment Survey data pertaining to Visit-1 alone, i.e during
the agriculture season from July to December 2012. However, since the sample for Visit-2 (Jan to June 2012) is almost the
same (except little less in number), we assume that the results discussed based on Visit-1 may be more or less valid for the
other agriculture season as well.
5 Essentially this technique helps in matching the background characteristics of treatment group and control group, for
whichever treatment we plan to analyze. In this case, we consider treatment to be a binary variable which signifies either a.
Awareness of farmers about MSP (MSP Aware, which takes values 0,1) or b. Source of technical advice (Tech Govt, which
takes values 0,1) respectively for the two sub-questions we plan to address.
6Treatment and Control Group background characteristics (explanatory variables excluding the grouping variable in the
corresponding regression) are matched, and resultant dataset is used for our regression model in each case
7Unlike in Awareness of MSP, PAgent Govt need not be collinear with the variable Tech Govt. Because those who are
aware of MSP alone will be able to sell to Govt agencies, while those who receive technical advice need not receive them from
Govt agencies alone.
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S.No Variable Name Description
1 DCV b5a q13 Total land used for agriculture
2 CropCode Choice of Major Crop during the season from July-December
2012 (Vector of Crop Dummies)
3 b4q7 Indicates whether any member of the household attended for-
mal training in agriculture
4 Tech Govt Indicates whether source of technical advice is from
Govt/Non-Govt agencies
5 InAgent Govt Indicates whether seeds or fertilizer inputs are procured from
Govt/Non-Govt agencies
6 pAgent Govt Indicates whether produce is sold to Govt/Non-Govt agencies
7 MSP Aware Indicates whether a farming household is aware of MSP or
not
8 lnTIC log(1 + TICi) as mentioned in the start of this section
9 State Variable accounting for state fixed effects (Vector of State
Dummies)
10 b3 q1 Household Size
11 b3 q2 Religion Code
12 b3 q3 Social Group
Table 1: List of constructed variables and their description for the purpose of study
lnTIC = β0+β1 MSP Aware +  – (1b),
Which essentially captures the effect of source of technical advice from government in farmers’ agriculture
incomes (As we controlled for other background characteristics using propensity score matching).
5.2 Role of public interventions - Provision of agricultural inputs
In order to understand the role of public interventions in terms of provision of agricultural inputs (for
addressing Q2 ), we construct a variable InAgent Govt, whose description is given in Table-1. We use this
as grouping variable or treatment variable for our model, and DCV b5a q13, CropCode, b4 q7, Tech Govt,
PAgent Govt, State, b3 q1,2, and 3 as our matching variables. As we can see, we are essentially controlling
for background characteristics like choice of crop, land usage, source of technical advice, choice of output
sale, state and HH fixed effects. Following regression model gives us the effect of government facilitated
inputs on agriculture incomes.
lnTIC = β0+β1 InAgent Govt +  – (2)
5.3 Role of public interventions - Provision of agricultural inputs
In order to understand the role of public interventions in terms of provision of procurement support (for
addressing Q3 ), we construct a variable PAgent Govt, whose description is given in Table-1. We use this
as grouping variable or treatment variable for our model, and DCV b5a q13, CropCode, b4 q7, Tech Govt,
InAgent Govt, State, b3 q1,2, and 3 as our matching variables. As we can see, we are essentially controlling
for background characteristics like choice of crop, land usage, source of technical advice, Choice of input
suppliers, state and HH fixed effects. Following regression model gives us the effect of government facilitated
procurement support on agriculture incomes.
lnTIC = β0+β1 PAgent Govt +  – (3)
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5.4 Results
Following tables-2 and 3 gives the regression results8 of the four models explained above. Figures depicting
corresponding propensity score distributions before and after matching is shown in the appendix section.
Table 2: Regression Results - (1a) and (1b)
Dependent variable:
lnTIC
Result1a Result1b
MSP Aware 0.471∗∗∗
(0.060)
Tech Govt 0.248∗∗∗
(0.072)
Constant 9.379∗∗∗ 9.489∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.051)
Observations 9,106 7,096
R2 0.007 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.002
Residual Std. Error 2.853 (df = 9104) 3.025 (df = 7094)
F Statistic 62.125∗∗∗ (df = 1; 9104) 11.967∗∗∗ (df = 1; 7094)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3: Regression Results - (2) and (3)
Dependent variable:
lnTIC
Result2 Result3
InAgent Govt −0.149∗
(0.083)
PAgent Govt 0.239∗
(0.122)
Constant 9.389∗∗∗ 10.222∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.086)
Observations 5,710 1,540
R2 0.001 0.002
Adjusted R2 0.0004 0.002
Residual Std. Error 3.129 (df = 5708) 2.397 (df = 1538)
F Statistic 3.238∗ (df = 1; 5708) 3.832∗ (df = 1; 1538)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
8We use stargazer package[5] in R for printing the regression results in this format
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From these results, we see that the role of public systems in terms of awareness and capacity building
are significant in improving agriculture income of farmers. While their role in terms of acting as agents in
facilitating input supply or output procurement is only slightly significant. Inferences that come up from
the latter results are that, public systems acting on the input supply side are somehow negatively affecting
the agriculture incomes, while their role as output procurement agents is positive.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Although above results might not reveal a complete picture of that segment in agriculture value chain,
in which farmers’ play critical role, nevertheless it helps us get a macro picture of how government in-
terventions play out in this segment. A major take away seems to be that, interventions like enhancing
the farmers’ awareness in terms of availing MSP, and enhancing capabilities of farmers through pertinent
technical advice, contribute positively and significantly to the agriculture income of farming households.
The second and another important result 9, seems to match with that of an existing study by Chatter-
jee et.al[4], where in the context of paddy procurement, it is found that government intervention improves
trade in favour of farmers. It seems like the slightly significant result showing a positive effect of the role
played by public procurement in improving agricultural incomes is broadly true when we look at an overall
picture of agriculture in the country. However, we couldn’t find relevant studies which might look into
input side government interventions and their manifestations at all India level, to compare our results with.
In any case, at first sight, the results seem to convey a negative effect on farmers’ agriculture incomes due
to government interventions in input side markets. A further deep-dive analysis is essential here to find
out the possible reasons behind this phenomenon.
In this study we have looked mainly into the segment of agriculture value chain where farmers are
involved. However, a standalone picture of this sort might not help in analyzing the overall importance
of public systems or government interventions in the complete value chain. Role played by government
in other segments of the value chain also need to be similarly analyzed and integrated, to essentially un-
derstand the gaps in public systems management in the context of agriculture value chains. Thorough
research of this sort may help policy makers to get a decent enough direction to look for improvement of
public systems in agriculture.
Also in this study, we limited ourselves to a binary view in terms of role played by Government or
non-government agencies in contributing to agriculture incomes. However, one can go further and see what
all players within the government and non-government agencies are actually contributing efficaciously to
the overall value chain. This might be an interesting and important study one can look at. In conclusion,
through this study we recommend researchers to take a public management perspective of looking at policy
networks within agriculture value chains, to better understand the role played by public systems at large.
Thorough research on these lines can build a strong foundation in improving the overall effectiveness of
these systems over a longer horizon.
9Discussed in Results section - Public systems acting on the input supply side are somehow negatively affecting the agriculture
incomes, while their role as output procurement agents is positive.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Distribution of propensity scores before and after matching
Figure 2: Treatment: Awareness of MSP
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Figure 3: Treatment: Source of Technical Advice (Govt/Non-Govt)
Figure 4: Treatment: Inputs from (Govt/Non-Govt)
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Figure 5: Treatment: Output sale to (Govt/Non-Govt)
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